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Welfare, Children and Families: The Impact
of Welfare Reform in the New Economy
William Julius Wilson
Harvard University
I am very pleased to have the
opportunity to share with you my thoughts
on a very timely topic in America—welfare
reform, a topic that has been very dominant
in the news. And a good deal of the
discussion has focused on the impact of this
legislation on welfare recipients and the
receipt of welfare.
But I must say that many of the
explanations for the observed changes in
welfare behavior are based on faulty
assumptions and tend to ignore competing
explanations for why the welfare
population has sharply declined since the
passage of this legislation.
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As we approach the period when Congress
has to reauthorize the welfare reform bill, I see
my role as a social scientist in the following
way: to use empirical evidence as a basis for
examining critically assumptions about welfare
reform --including assumptions that led to the
passage of the welfare reform legislation, and
the continued use of these assumptions to
explain changes in the welfare population
since the enactment of this historic piece of
legislation in 1996. I hold to the view that we
cannot make wise policy decisions without
adequate information. My talk today is
motivated by this view, which includes, in the
latter part, a discussion of my current research.
When I lecture on issues of poverty and
welfare policy in the United States I like to
begin by placing the issues in a broader crosscultural perspective. Despite the increasing
strains on the European welfare state and cries
to cut back on welfare benefits so as to combat
unemployment, there are notable differences
between the United States and Europe in the
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extent to which problems of poverty and
inequality are addressed.
In contrast to many European nations, the
United States has not created comprehensive
programs to promote the social rights of
American citizens, including rights to
employment, economic security, education,
and health care. Social rights!
In comparison with Canada and most
western European countries, social rights in
the United States are less developed and less
intertwined with political and civil rights.
Although social rights increased in the United
States after World War II, with the rise of social
security and other benefits, they have yet to
reach the levels enjoyed by the citizens of
Western Europe. For example, American
housing policies to promote home ownership
have tended to benefit the working and middle
classes, not the poor. "Direct financial housing
subsidies for low-income families, common in
European welfare states, have been virtually
non-existent in the United States."
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The housing made available to the poor in
the United States tends to be confined to a
limited number of public projects
disproportionately concentrated in inner-city
neighborhoods far from employment
opportunities and informal job information
networks. Moreover, western European
societies have always had a much more
comprehensive program of unemployment
insurance, and the gap has widened each year
since the U.S. program lost ground in the early
years of the Reagan administration
Finally, in western European countries,
where services such as medical care are
considered the basic right of all citizens, the
poor tend to be covered by the same
comprehensive medical programs as the
working and middle classes. In the United
States, however, Medicaid, a health program
for poor people, pays doctors much less than
either Medicare or private health insurers pay
for the same services. As a result, many
doctors refuse to take Medicaid patients, and
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many medical procedures required to treat
certain illnesses are not covered by Medicaid.
Moreover, anti-poverty programs have
been narrowly targeted and fragmented. The
most rapid growth in expenditures for U.S.
welfare programs has been in universal
entitlements such as Social Security and
Medicare--programs whose elderly recipients
tend to be members of the working and middle
classes.
Food stamps, Medicaid, and the
Supplemental Security Income program (SSI)
do provide some relief for the poor, but as
currently designed, they have little effect on
the poverty rates among the non-elderly. In
short, targeted programs for the poor in the
United States do not even begin to address
inequities in the social class system. Instead of
helping to integrate the recipients into the
broader economic and social life of mainstream
society--as the GI bill and the postwar federal
mortgage programs did for working- and
middle-class whites—these targeted programs
tend to stigmatize and separate the poor.

6

Furthermore, although economic inequality
has increased in all western democracies in the
last several decades, unlike in the United States
official and scholarly explanations of the
widening gap between the haves and havenots in Europe tend to focus much more on the
changes and inequities in the broader society,
than on individual deficiencies and behavior.
Therefore, public rhetoric lends much greater
support to the ideology of social citizenship
rights—the right to employment, economic
security, health care, education, and so on.
Also, welfare programs that benefit wide
segments of the population, such as child care,
children allowances (an annual benefit per
child), housing subsidies, education, medical
care, and unemployment insurance have been
firmly institutionalized in many western
European democracies. Efforts to cut back on
these programs in the face of growing
joblessness do not just threaten the poor, and
thus they have met firm resistance from
working- and middle-class citizens.
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However, in the United States not only do
welfare programs that benefit the poor lack
institutional safeguards, but the basic belief
system concerning the nature and causes of
poverty and welfare frames economic and
social outcomes mainly in individual terms.
This allows conservative intellectuals and
policymakers to overemphasize the negative
aspects of persistent joblessness and the receipt
of welfare by playing on the key individualistic
and moralistic themes of this dominant
American belief system. Accordingly, the
tragic nature and social causes of such
problems are lost on a public that holds truly
disadvantaged groups, such as inner-city
minorities, largely responsible for their plight.
The public framing of social outcomes has
profound implications for the proposals
advanced by members of society to address
sensitive problems like inner-city poverty and
joblessness. Beliefs that associate joblessness
and poverty with individual shortcomings do
not generate strong support for social
programs intended to end inequality. No one

8

understood this idea better than the British
social scientist T. H. Marshall. If we follow his
classic thesis on the development of
citizenship, we see that when the fundamental
principle linking poverty to the social class and
racial structure is recognized or acknowledged
in Western society, the emphasis on the rights
of citizens will tend to go beyond civil and
political rights to include social rights--that is,
"the whole range from the right to a modicum
of economic welfare and security to the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to
live the life of a civilized being according to the
standards prevailing in the society."
However, as critics of American approaches
to the study of poverty and welfare have
shown repeatedly, concerns about the civil and
political aspects of citizenship in the United
States (unlike in Europe) have overshadowed
concerns about the social aspects of citizenship
because of a strong belief system that deemphasizes the social origins and social
significance of poverty and welfare.
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Data from public opinion polls consistently
indicate that Americans tend to be far more
concerned about the duties or social obligations
of the poor, particularly the welfare poor, than
about their social rights as American citizens.
As far back as the New Deal, Americans have
persistently debated whether recipients of
welfare checks should be required to work.
Public opinion polls over the years have
revealed strong support for a work
requirement for those on welfare.
Underlying such overwhelming public
sentiment against welfare is the belief that the
moral character of individuals, not inequities
in the social and economic structure of society,
is at the root of the problem. In recent opinion
polls, for example, more than 9 out of 10
Americans felt that lack of effort was either
very or somewhat important as a cause of
poverty. Fewer than 10 percent felt that it was
not important. Such findings contrast sharply
with those based on similar surveys conducted
in 12 European countries (the United
Kingdom, Ireland, France, Denmark, Belgium,
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the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Italy). Citizens of
these countries favored structural explanations
(such as lack of jobs) over individual
explanations by a wide margin. Two-thirds of
the Europeans associated poverty with either
social injustice, misfortune, or changes in the
modern world. Over the years only 15 to 17
percent felt that poverty was the result of
laziness or a lack of will power—popular
individual explanations in the United States.
Americans are especially critical of the
welfare poor. Recent national surveys reveal
widespread support for the notion that most
welfare recipients do not share the majority
view about the importance of hard work.
Indeed, a liberal-conservative consensus on
welfare reform emerged in the latter 1980s that
features two themes: (1) the receipt of welfare
should be predicated on reciprocal
responsibilities whereby society is obligated to
provide assistance to welfare applicants, who,
in turn, are obligated to behave in socially
endorsed ways, and (2) able-bodied adult
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welfare recipients should be required to
prepare themselves for work, to search for
employment, and to accept jobs when they are
offered. These points of agreement have been
the focus of a good deal of the public
discussions concerning welfare reform since
then.
These two themes are based on the implicit
assumption that a sort of mysterious "welfare
ethos" exists that encourages public assistance
recipients to avoid their obligations as citizens
to be educated, to work, to support their
families, and to obey the law. In other words,
"it is the moral fabric of individuals, not the social
and economic structure of society, that is taken to be
the root of the problem."
During the period of rising inequality, the
period from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s,
the period when ordinary working Americans
were struggling to make ends meet, political
arguments that embodied such assumptions—
that the moral fabric of individuals is the root
of the problem-- resonated with the general
public and, I believe, contributed to the drastic
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decline in state support for the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,
prior to the signing of the 1996 welfare reform
bill.
Families receiving AFDC were far worse
off in 1995 than those who had received public
assistance twenty years earlier. Between 1975
and 1995, after adjusting for inflation, the
benefit level had declined in every state, so
much so that the average real value of AFDC
nationwide had plummeted 37 percent during
this period. Increases in food stamp benefits
slightly cushioned, but far from offset, the
losses in AFDC purchasing power. "Between
July 1972 and 1992, the combined value of
AFDC and food stamps for a three-person
family with no countable income dropped 26%
on average.”
The erosion of AFDC benefits became a
landslide after 1991. Only six states (Alabama,
Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, and
South Dakota) maintained or increased the
level of benefits between January 1991 and
January 1994. Benefit levels were actually cut
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in nine states, sometimes more than once, and
they did not keep pace with inflation in the
remaining states. Never in the history of the
program had so “many states enacted such
deep cuts for so many families over such a
short time period."
When Congress initiated the legislative
process to convert AFDC to block grants,
relating benefit levels to housing costs could
perhaps best assess the plight of AFDC
families. In nearly every state, the full monthly
AFDC benefit was not sufficient to cover the
costs of "what the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) considers to
be 'decent, safe, and sanitary' housing of a
'modest' nature."
The Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law found that in 78 of 95 representative
localities across the United States, the fair
market rent (FMR) for two-bedroom housing
was more than the total monthly benefit for an
AFDC family of three. "In cities like Newark,
Chicago, Philadelphia, Denver, Atlanta, New
Orleans, St. Louis, and Memphis, the AFDC
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benefit [was] less than two-thirds of the FMR
for two-bedroom housing." Housing subsidies
did not offset these deficiencies. In fact, only
23 percent of all AFDC families received some
form of housing subsidy or lived in public
housing in 1992.
The collapse of support for AFDC
recipients was related to fundamental
assumptions about the nature of welfare and
welfare families, including the beliefs that most
welfare families are long- term recipients and
that most are black women with many
children. But studies that analyze welfare data,
including monthly data on who receives how
much welfare, challenge these assumptions.
Only a minority of the AFDC recipients were
African-American in 1995, and the average
number of children in welfare families was
slightly less than the average number in nonwelfare families. Moreover, the research based
on monthly data indicates that the AFDC
welfare population was very dynamic, that is,
subject to frequent change.
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Prior to the signing of the 1996 welfare
reform bill, people tended to go on and off
welfare in short spurts, and about one-third
had been on welfare more than once. Half of
all welfare recipients exited welfare during the
first year, and three-quarters departed within
two years. Many of those who quickly exited
the welfare rolls during the first year, however,
returned.
There was considerable movement between
welfare and work. Many mothers would go off
welfare and enter low-wage employment, try
unsuccessfully to make ends meet, and then
return to welfare. Some repeated this pattern
again and again. Also, recent research reveals
that it is not the lack of work ethic that causes
these mothers to return or remain on welfare.
Not only did they prefer work to welfare, but
permanent welfare receipt was anathema to
them.
As unemployment in the general
population rises, the probability of exiting
welfare diminishes. It is not surprising that
those who are least employable in terms of
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skills and training are least successful in
avoiding welfare. The longer a mother
remains off welfare, the less likely it is that she
will return. An examination of the long-term
data on multiple spells of welfare reflects the
high turnover. Thirty percent of welfare
recipients were on AFDC for less than two
years, and 50 percent received welfare for less
than four years. These figures include
recipients who have gone off and then
returned to welfare during these periods. Only
15 percent remained continuously on welfare
for five years or more.
Long-term welfare mothers tended to be
racial minorities, never-married individuals,
high school dropouts and those who lack
employment experiences. "The overall picture
[was] that one group [used] welfare for
relatively short periods of time and never
[returned]. A middle group [cycled] on and
off, some for short periods and others for
longer periods, but again, not for five
continuous years. And a third, but quite small
group, [stayed] on for long periods of time."

17

As the Northwestern University sociologist
Kathryn Edin points out, we often fail to
consider that when AFDC was still in
operation "states set . . . benefits too low to live
on. Because of this basic fact, women had to
supplement their welfare income with either
unreported work or covert contributions from
boyfriends, friends or relatives." Moreover, we
also often ignore the fact that "low-wage jobs
[often] do not pay enough to support a family .
. . and offer little access to better-paying jobs."
Indeed, Edin found that those who left
[welfare] for work were “even more likely to
be poor in the second year after leaving
welfare than they were in the first."
Why? Simply because many low-wage jobs
do not provide health care benefits, and most
working mothers had to pay for transportation,
spend more for child care, and purchase better
clothing. Working mothers also had to spend
more for housing because it is more difficult
for them to qualify for housing subsidies.
With these additional expenses, Edin estimated
that the average low-income working mother
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would have to spend $317 a month more [in
1995 dollars] than her welfare counterpart to
maintain the same standard of living. Edin
states:
These figures mean that the average mother
who left welfare for full-time work would
experience at least a 33 percent gap
between what she could expect to earn and
what she would need to earn to meet her
expenses. Any profit she might gain from
her work would be eaten up by the extra
costs associated with leaving welfare for a
job, meaning that she would have to
continue generating large amounts of
outside income. However, since she would
be working a full-time job she would have
less available time in which to do so.
Edin's research revealed that since the
working mothers could not live solely on the
income from their full-time, low-wage jobs,
they had to generate considerable outside
income to make ends meet, including income
from overtime hours or second jobs, earned
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income tax credits, food stamps, and the
contributions of relatives and friends.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many
welfare-reliant mothers chose not to enter the
formal labor market. It would not have been in
their best economic interest to do so. Given the
economic realities, it is also not surprising that
many who had been working in these lowwage jobs decided to rely on or return to
welfare.
For example, in our Chicago research one
welfare mother from a South Side poverty
neighborhood explained her decision to remain
on welfare in 1988, even though she would like
"to go out there and get a job." She states:
I was workin' and then I had two kids.
And I'm struggling. I was making, like,
close to seven dollars an hour. . . . I had to
pay a babysitter. Then I had to deal with
my kids when I got home. And I couldn't
even afford medical insurance. . . . I was so
scared, when my kids were sick or
somethin', . . . because I have been turned
away from a hospital because I did not
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have a medical card. I don't like being on
public aid. But . . . what do I do when my
kids get sick?
In the early 1990s, based on the influential
writings of the social scientist David Ellwood,
my colleague at Harvard, a comprehensive
liberal vision of welfare reform that
highlighted the dignity of work and challenged
some of the simplistic individualistic
assumptions of the American belief system on
poverty and welfare emerged.
This vision recognized that although
welfare is not the major cause of social
dislocations, efforts should be made to
facilitate the transition from welfare to work
for several reasons: welfare recipients prefer
work over welfare and would readily accept
jobs that will not result in their slipping deeper
into poverty; nonwork or idleness has certain
debilitating effects on individuals and on
family life over time; and children are worse
off if they are widely exposed to an
environment where few or no people work.
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Implicit in this vision is the view that work
is not simply a way to make a living and
support one's family. It also constitutes a
framework for daily behavior and patterns of
interaction because it imposes disciplines and
regularities. Thus, in the absence of regular
employment, a person lacks not only a place in
which to work and the receipt of regular
income but also a coherent organization of the
present--that is, a system of concrete
expectations and goals. Regular employment
provides the anchor for the spatial and
temporal aspects of daily life. It determines
where you are going to be and when you are
going to be there. In the absence of regular
employment, life, including family life,
becomes less coherent. Persistent
unemployment and irregular employment
hinder rational planning in daily life, the
necessary condition of adaptation to a modern
economy.
Advocates of this liberal approach, which
involves the assumption that welfare mothers
prefer work over welfare, argued that welfare
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reform should not be undertaken in isolation.
They maintain that welfare reform should also
be conjoined with programs to establish
universal health insurance so that public aid
recipients who want to "go out there and get a
job" do not face the dilemma posed by the
Chicago welfare mother in 1988 who, to repeat,
stated: "I don't like being on public aid. But
without a medical card, “what do I do when
my kids get sick?"
Equally important, proponents of this
liberal approach maintained that welfare
reform should be tied to efforts to create jobs
for the disadvantaged. And they supported
enthusiastically those aspects of social reform
that are designed to "make work pay,"
principally through the expansion of the
earned income tax credit (which is a wage
subsidy for the poor), the creation of universal
health insurance, the development of child care
programs, and the establishment of child
support provisions to ensure contributions
from absent parents.
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All of these subsidies and benefits designed
to make low-wage work pay were originally
incorporated into the initial proposals for
welfare reform discussed by President Clinton
and his advisers in 1993. Welfare reform was
thus part of a more comprehensive agenda of
social reform. It was argued that to ease the
transition from welfare to work it is not only
necessary to help local government create
public- sector jobs when private-sector jobs are
lacking and to turn welfare offices into
"transitional" centers for training and job
placement, it is also important to have in place
universal health insurance to make any kind of
welfare reform program viable.
President Clinton's initial welfare reform
proposal did, however, include a feature that
reflected the liberal-conservative consensus on
reciprocal obligations--namely, that welfare
receipt should end after two years. In the
original Clinton proposal, a welfare recipient
would be required to undergo training and job
placement during the two-year maintenance
period and then accept jobs in the private
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sector. If private-sector jobs were not available
at that time, then a number of public-sector
jobs would have to be created.
As UCLA law professor Joel F. Handler
appropriately noted, the conservatives, as well
as many others in the nation, "seized on the
time-limits and paid only lip service to the
other provisions." Work preparation
continued to be talked about, but the allimportant components of guaranteed jobs and
guaranteed child support at the end of the twoyear period were rarely mentioned. And the
lack of concern for these issues was reflected in
the welfare reform bill that was passed in 1996.
Indeed, following the Republican landslide
in the 1994 congressional elections, discussions
of welfare reform reflected even more the
individualistic beliefs that many Americans
hold concerning poverty and welfare, beliefs
reflecting the view that it is the moral character
of individuals not inequities in the larger
society that is the root of the problem, beliefs
that were embodied in the largely Republican
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drafted welfare reform bill that Bill Clinton felt
compelled to sign in 1996.
This bill, and the recent changes in the
welfare programs of nearly every state,
constitute the greatest shift in social policy for
low-income families with children since the
Social Security Act of 1935. The key provisions
of these new policies--including an end to the
entitlement to cash welfare benefits, a work
requirement after two years, and a time limit of
five years or less--are stricter than any observer
of welfare policy could have imagined a
decade ago.
Even before the 1996 legislation, welfare
reform had been progressing through waivers
that the federal government had granted to
over 40 states to experiment with new
programs. The new federal legislation permits
states to keep provisions for which they
received waivers, even if these waivers are
more restrictive than the provisions in the
legislation. For example, many states have
received approval for “family cap” waivers
that deny additional cash assistance to
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recipients who have children while on the
welfare rolls, and these states may still
implement the family caps even though the
federal legislation does not require them.
Moreover, states are now able to implement
tough restrictions for which waivers were not
granted. For instance, Massachusetts has a
time limit of only two years of cash assistance,
not five years.
Thus, the stage has been set for an
unprecedented national experiment: public
assistance is to be temporary and will no
longer indefinitely support women staying at
home. And during the time they receive public
assistance, they are required to seek
employment. In 1996 many liberals, including
myself, felt that the passage of this legislation
would have devastating consequences for the
welfare poor, including a sharp increase in
child poverty.
However, as conservatives are quick to
point out, the widely predicted disasters
following the passage of the welfare reform
legislation have so far not materialized.
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Contrary to the expectations of many, the
passage of the 1996 welfare reform bill has not
removed the nation’s safety net.
A significant majority of welfare recipients
are finding employment. Caseloads have
dramatically declined (from 12 million in
August 1996 to about 6 million today, a 50
percent drop). And the fixed funding feature
of the block grants combined with the sharp
drop in welfare caseloads across the country
have resulted in surpluses, enabling states to
either maintain or expand benefits--including
allowing working mothers to retain more of
their cash welfare benefits because of more
generous income disregard rules (that is, rules
governing the extent to which additional
income from working will affect the size of a
mother’s welfare check).
The surpluses also enable states to
liberalize overly restrictive asset limits; invest
in child care, transportation, and postsecondary training, especially for families with
the severest employment barriers; and give
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wage supplements to a larger number of the
disadvantaged families.
And contrary to the liberal prediction, child
poverty has declined, not increased, since the
passage of the welfare reform legislation.
But, I raise this question, would such
positive outcomes prevail if we had not been
experiencing this incredible economic boom?
The timing of the passage of the welfare reform
legislation could not have been better. It
occurred in a period that includes strong
economic growth, extremely low
unemployment rates, and increases in the
minimum wage, all of which enlarged the
employment and earnings of poor families
overall.
Overall, the signs for disadvantaged
groups in this economy have been
encouraging. Real wage growth for lowskilled workers has been quite impressive since
1997. For example, except for male workers at
the ninetieth percentile of the wage
distribution, those at the thirtieth percentile
and below experienced the highest percentage
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hourly wage increase from 1996 to 1999
(ranging from 4.7 to 6.4 percent). Recent
increases in the minimum wage, which had not
changed at all from the time Reagan took office
to 1996, help to account for some of this wage
growth, but the prolonged strong economy
undoubtedly contributed.
Also, the ranks of those in the labor market
who are out of work for more than six
months—the long-term jobless-- declined from
almost two million in January 1993 to 640,000
in January 2001. Moreover, the unemployment
rate of high school dropouts declined from 12
percent in 1992 to just 6 percent at the end of
year. Most of this decline has occurred since
1997. Furthermore, the black unemployment
rate dipped to 7 percent last year, the lowest
since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began
compiling comparable unemployment data by
race in 1972.
The positive effects of these changes are
seen in even the most depressed
neighborhoods of the city. A recent study of
low-wage workers in 322 metropolitan areas,
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by the economists Richard Freeman and
William M. Rogers, reveals that black men
aged 18 to 24 with a high school education or
less--including many with prison records--are
employed in greater numbers, earning larger
paychecks and committing fewer crimes than
in the early 1990s.
The benefits of a strong economy,
particularly a sustained tight labor market, for
low-skilled workers should be emphasized in
economic policy discussions. Unlike the
situation for workers in a tight labor market, in
a slack labor market—a labor market with high
unemployment-- employers are, indeed can
afford to be, more selective in recruiting and in
granting promotions. They overemphasize job
prerequisites and exaggerate the value of
experience. In such an economic climate,
disadvantaged minorities, especially those
with low levels of literacy, suffer
disproportionately and employer
discrimination rises.
In a tight labor market, on the other hand,
job vacancies are numerous, unemployment is
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of short duration, and wages are higher.
Moreover, in a tight labor market the labor
force expands because increased job
opportunities not only reduce unemployment,
but also draw into the labor force those
workers who, in periods when the labor
market is slack, respond to fading job
prospects by dropping out of the labor force
altogether. Thus, in a tight labor market the
status of all workers—including disadvantaged
minorities—improves because of lower
unemployment and higher wages.
However, there are now signs that the
economy is slowing down. This is unfortunate.
If we could extend this economic boom for
several more years, it would significantly
lower the overall jobless rate in areas such as
the inner-city ghetto, not only for low-skilled
workers still in the labor force but for those
who have been outside the labor marker for
many years as well. In addition, it would
enhance the job prospects of many welfare
recipients who reach the time limit on the
receipt of welfare.
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Nonetheless, despite the robust economy,
there are some groups that are worse off
because of welfare reform. The average
disposable income of the poorest single
mothers was lower in 1999 than in 1995.
Between 1993 and 1995 the bottom 20 percent
of female-headed households experienced
increases in earning and income. However,
from 1995 to 1999, though earnings continued
to grow, disposable income (income retained
after payment of taxes) declined largely
because of declines in the receipt of meanstested benefits such as food stamps.
Many mothers leaving welfare fail to
receive key supports, including Medicaid, food
stamps, child care assistance, even though they
continue to be eligible for these services. There
has been a substantial decline in the
participation of the food stamps program and a
notable decline in the participation of
Medicaid, despite significant expansion in
Medicaid eligibility.1 The research suggests
1

One study reveals that “since the advent of welfare reform in 1996, nearly
one million low-income working parents in 15 states lost Medicaid coverage,
mainly as they moved from welfare to work. This represented a decline of 27
percent. We know from work done by the Urban Institute and others that only
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that many families who no longer receive cash
aid or are discouraged from seeking cash
assistance may not be aware that they remain
eligible for food stamps and Medicaid.
Despite a strong economy, progress in
reducing the depth and severity of child
poverty halted between 1995 and 1999. During
this period the number of poor children only
slightly declined and on average those who
remain poor became poorer. Many lowincome families experienced significant
earnings gains between 1995 and 1999 only to
see them offset by the declines in means-tested
benefits, leaving them no better off
economically in a booming economic period.
Finally, in a research project that I am codirecting that includes a survey of about 2,500
children and their caregivers in low-income
neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San
Antonio, seventeen percent of all families that
had received welfare in the previous two years
reported that their benefits had been reduced
about one-fourth of parents moving from welfare to work have employersponsored health insurance so it is fair to assume that the vast majority of
parents who lost Medicaid are now uninsured.” Statement of Joan C. Alker,
Associate Director of Government Affairs, Families USA, 9/15/00.
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or eliminated because the welfare office said
they weren’t following the rules. The most
common reasons were missing meetings –
usually with caseworkers – or failing to file
required paperwork such as earnings records.
Less commonly, some had refused to cooperate
with child support enforcement or had not
complied with other rules, and, contrary to
expectations associated with the American
belief system on poverty and welfare, only a
very small percentage had refused to take a
job.
We found that the penalized parents, when
compared to all other current or recent welfare
recipients, showed more signs of distress.
They had less education and poorer health.
They reported lower monthly incomes and
were more likely to have used food pantries
and emergency clothing services and to have
had times when they couldn’t afford enough
food. They were more likely to have problems
with substance abuse. Their housing was of
poorer quality; and they were more likely to
live in neighborhoods with abandoned houses,
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assaults and muggings, gangs, and drug
dealing in the open.
Moreover, parents who left the rolls
because the welfare office said they didn’t
follow the rules were far less successful in
finding jobs than were parents who left welfare
for other reasons. Only 36 percent of the
former group were employed at the time of our
interview, compared to 67 percent of the latter
group.
Our interviews and observations suggest
that most of the penalized parents had daily
lives filled with complex family obligations,
challenging work responsibilities, or personal
turmoil. These broader difficulties made it
harder for them to satisfy the welfare rules. In
our study, about half were able to get their
benefits back; nevertheless, in these three cities,
sanctions and case closings for infractions were
clustered among families that, on average,
were more vulnerable than other welfare
families. Some of these families lacked the
resources to navigate the program rules.
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Moreover, although mothers who have left
TANF, including the vast majority who were
not sanctioned, have an average employment
rate of 63 percent after leaving,1 this average
obscures significant variation across different
groups of women, some of whom have done
much better than the average and some of
whom have done much worse. Women with
lower levels of education, poorer health status,
with younger children, and who are
themselves young have considerably lower
rates of employment and post-welfare income
levels than women with higher levels of
education, better health status, with older
children, and who are older themselves.
Outcomes also differ among those leavers who
have a history of greater welfare dependence.
The employment rate and, especially, the level
of income among these leavers are
considerably worse than average.
The existence of significant numbers of
women who have not fared well after leaving
welfare should be a source of concern,
especially given the strong economy. If they
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are struggling now, what will happen to these
women when the economy does indeed slow
down, as current signs suggest? These leavers
deserve the attention of policy makers who
will soon be considering, under
reauthorization, modifications in welfare
programs or will be designing special
programs to assist those former welfare
recipients who are in greatest need.
Accordingly, it is premature to declare
welfare reform a successful experiment. We do
not know what will happen to these families
and other low-income families, including
welfare-reliant families, when the economy
returns to normal or when we enter a period of
economic stagnation.
Finally, our research has uncovered
problems confronting welfare and former
welfare recipients in the transition from
welfare to work that are rarely discussed in the
media. For example, ethnographic data that
our researchers have collected in San Antonio
suggest a close relationship between mother
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absenteeism and tardiness on the jobs, on the
one hand, and childhood illnesses.
It seems that the kids in many of the homes
in poor neighborhoods are constantly sick.
These illnesses are undoubtedly related to
inadequate health care, poor housing
conditions, and unsanitary physical
environments--environments where flies and
maggots breed, where the plumbing is stopped
up and not repaired, where open sewers are
found, and where rats bite helpless infants. In
such environments the conditions of life are
often brutal. In such environments many
children have persistent low-grade fevers and
infectious diseases spread easily and rapidly.
Also our ethnographic research in Boston
reveals that the problem of finding adequate
child care is one of the most stressful
experiences of poor working mothers. Given
the tight labor market, the turnover of workers
in child-care facilities is huge. The wages for
child-care workers is relatively low and the
strong economy has enabled many of these
workers to seek and find higher-paying
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employment. The end result is that many
mothers discover to their dismay that their
children are not receiving quality care in these
child-care settings. For example, when one
harried mother arrived to pick up her child at a
Boston day-care center, she discovered that her
child was being taking care of by the janitor
because several of the child care providers
failed to show up.
The child illnesses and problems of
adequate health care create considerable stress
among mothers who on the one hand worry
about getting to work or getting to work on
time and, on the other hand, try to deal with
the illnesses of their children or the problems
of their child care. And many employers,
influenced by the American belief system on
poverty and welfare, are quick to attribute the
mothers’ tardiness or absence on the job to a
poor work ethic.
In the final analysis, we should not ignore
the point that the welfare reform bill has been
in effect for only a short period of time during
one of the most remarkable economic periods
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in recent memory. Even in the best of times,
some groups are experiencing real difficulty.
We should all be concerned about the lack of
preparation in many states for addressing the
problems that will surface when we return to
normal economic times or, even worse, when
we enter a recession or a period of economic
stagnation.
We have been inundated with all the good
news about welfare reform, it is now time to
raise the consciousness of Americans,
particularly those who strongly subscribe to
the American belief system on poverty and
welfare, about the bad news, especially the
potentially bad news if the economy turns
sour. Thank you.
1

Our research is designed to evaluate the consequences of welfare reform

for the well-being of children and families and to follow these families as welfare
reform evolves. The study comprises three interrelated components: (1) a
longitudinal survey of approximately 2,500 families with children in low-income
neighborhoods, about 40 percent of whom were receiving cash welfare payments
when they were interviewed in 1999. These families represent a random sample
in each city of poor and near-poor families who live in low-income
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neighborhoods. In addition, at the 36 month mark, a second sample of about
1,250 families, focused primarily on young parents who are just coming of age
and encountering the welfare system for the first time under the new rules, will
be selected and interviewed; (2) an embedded developmental study of a subset
of about 630 children age two to four in 1999 and their caregivers, which
consisted of video-taped assessments of children’s behaviors and caregiverschild interaction, observations of child-care settings, and interviews with fathers;
(3) an ethnographic study of about 215 families not in the survey (but residing in
the same neighborhood) who will be followed for 12 to 18 months using in-depth
interviewing and participant observation and subsequently interviews. About 45
of the families in the ethnography will include a child with a physical or mental
disability. A detailed description of the research design can be found in Welfare,
Children and Families: A Three City Study. Overview and Design Report, available at
jhu.edu/~welfare or in hardcopy upon request. The principal investigators of
this project are Ronald Angel, University of Texas; Linda Burton, Pennsylvania
State University; Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Northwestern University; Andrew
Cherlin, Johns Hopkins University; Robert Moffitt, Johns Hopkins University;
and William Julius Wilson, Harvard University.

